Integrated Review: Will it last the course?
“Planned strategy was not his strong card. He preferred to work by intuition and impulse.”
Alan Brooke on Winston Churchill, 1944
A sound strategy must combine a realistic analysis of the external environment, a coherent statement of policy to engage with those challenges and an understanding of the resources needed to deliver it. The Integrated Review aspires to be the most significant statement of post-Cold War British grand strategy. Does it, at least on paper, succeed?
Its assessment of the external environment centres on the growing power of China, systemic competition between states and non-state actors, technological change and what it calls ‘transnational challenges’ such as climate changes, global health and terrorism.
However, the sweep and scale of the challenges the Review identifies means that - in policy terms – it must try to do a lot of things at once. This includes making a case for the UK to be even more active in distant regions, when it is being battered by a pandemic at home. Critics of the Government think it’s a deluded return to the pre-Suez mindset, though it’s defenders say greater engagement with the Indo-Pacific region is unavoidable in the modern context.
Though the United States remains the most important ally and partner for the UK, it is no longer the global hegemon and the growing importance and influence of China pervades the strategy. The Review also recognises that the UK is and remains a European nation, but places far more emphasis on bilateral relations with Member States while, perhaps predictably and pettily, overlooking the role of the EU as an institutional player on our doorstep with geopolitical aspirations of its own. There is growing evidence of the UK’s enthusiasm for the CANZUK nexus (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK) as an alliance for pressing common areas of interest, including the treatment of Hong Kong by China. Critics of this approach will note that the UK already had strong forums to work with these nations (such as the Commonwealth and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence partnership), and relations with these nations is not a realistic substitute for its previous membership of the EU.
Hawkishness towards China has grown significantly on the Conservative backbenches in recent months, and indeed throughout British politics. While the PM’s statement criticised China for its policies towards Hong Kong and the Uighurs, its geopolitical heft means that non-engagement is not a realistic option for the Government. The PM does not share the strident Sino-scepticism of many of his MPs and the UK will continue to engage with China on economic matters and to tackle climate change. China is dubbed a ‘strategic competitor’ which is quite a long way from the hostile state that many Conservatives consider it to be. Nonetheless, the days of the UK talking of a ‘Golden Era’ in relations with China, with former Chancellor George Osborne seeking to significantly strengthen ties between both countries, seem to be well and truly over.
The Indo-Pacific tilt – or at least this most recent Indo-Pacific tilt - is also driven at least partly by China. The unspoken but obvious intention of this policy is to build links with democratic countries who can be counterweights to Chinese influence in the region including India, Australia and South Korea. The PM will visit India, the UK has applied to become an ASEAN partner has already applied to join the CPTPP. HMS Queen Elizabeth will visit the region on her first operational voyage. This approach mirrors that of the Biden Administration, which is seeking to use its ‘Quad’ alliance (of the US, India, Japan and Australia) to counter Beijing’s influence.
There is a strong sense that the UK’s security and defence apparatus is set up for fighting the last war even though, seemingly out of nowhere, an increase in the cap to the UK's nuclear arsenal is announced. A major thread of the strategy is the ‘new frontiers’ of cyber, AI and space – areas where Russia and China are seen to excel. The UK has observed with growing interest how new forms of ‘hybrid’ combat are increasingly defining 21st Century warfare - from the devastating use by Turkey of drones in last year’s Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, to the increasing use of cyber techniques to spread disinformation by Russia. The central proposition of this Review is that reducing traditional ‘hard power’ capabilities of conventional warfare - in favour of new, niche tech capabilities - will provide the UK with the agile strengths to fight tomorrow’s wars.
It is also worth noting that this strategy aims to use the defence budget not just as a means of prosecuting modern cyber warfare, but also as a tool to support regional investment and productivity and even to help bind the Union together. At a time when the Government is said to be going cold on the idea of an industrial strategy, the phrase is used is broad daylight.
This leads us to the vexed question of resources - the means by which this strategy will be delivered. Labour has astutely picked up on the areas where the Government’s rhetoric has not matched its actions. The defence budget is perennially overcommitted, due to overspend on procurement programmes, and the FCO and aid budget have both been cut. If new capabilities are to be developed, others will need to be scaled-back, possibly very significantly. This Review does not spell those cuts out at all, but cuts to the army are widely being reported and will be detailed in a forthcoming Defence Command Paper. This is perhaps the biggest question of the Review. How much of the conventional armed forces will be left if resources are deployed into these other areas?
However, there are questions of style as well as substance. This document is a serious attempt to frame the UK’s role in the world in a systematic way. However, its delivery will involve years of patient application, forging of new alliances in the East and facing down formidable vested interests at home. However, Boris Johnson is without doubt a politician who relies – like his hero Churchill – on gut and guile. Will a planned strategy survive Boris Johnson’s impulses or the anti-China instincts of the Tory benches? Will the next reshuffle see a change of personnel in the key Departments? Will it prove to be flexible enough to accommodate the next unexpected event? And most importantly of all, can the resources be matched to the ambition? A strategic approach from the Government is to be applauded. However, it must now be delivered – and for all his formidable political talents, planned strategy is not Mr Johnson’s strong card.